On Saturday 10 May 2025 at 20:14 UTC, a GRE flood targeted a crypto exchange customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 239.4 Gbps and lasted 175 minutes. Traffic originated from 1866 autonomous systems in 90 countries, predominantly a Mirai-derived IoT botnet.
| Vector | GRE flood |
| Peak | 239.4 Gbps |
| Duration | 175 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.471 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.063% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.41% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 32 points of presence.
What the customer saw
A brief increase in p99 latency of 63 ms during the first minute, then normal service.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
How does the proof-of-work challenge behave on older Android devices? Any numbers below Android 10?
Clear and practical, thanks.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
How does the proof-of-work challenge behave on older Android devices? Any numbers below Android 10?