Introducing adaptive proof-of-work difficulty (part 2)

Over the last few months we have spent a lot of time on introducing adaptive proof-of-work difficulty. This is what we learned.

What we got wrong

Our first version challenged too eagerly on mobile networks, where thousands of real users share a handful of carrier-grade NAT addresses. Reputation that is shared is reputation that is noisy.

We now weight fingerprint consistency and session behaviour far more heavily than IP reputation for traffic from known mobile carrier ranges.

Compliance is a side effect

Regulators increasingly ask for evidence of resilience, not just promises. An incident timeline with start, peak, vectors and impact is exactly the evidence DORA and NIS2 ask for — and it falls out of good observability for free.

We export incident reports in formats auditors can file without anyone rewriting them.

What we changed

We moved the decision from a single threshold to a continuous score, added an explanation to every decision and made every rule testable against historical traffic before it goes live.

The result is fewer late-night pages for our analysts and — more importantly — fewer real users challenged by mistake.

Protecting the origin

None of this matters if the attacker can reach your origin directly. Historical DNS records, certificate transparency logs and misconfigured subdomains leak origin addresses all the time.

Allow-list the edge ranges, enable authenticated origin pulls and treat any origin IP that ever appeared in public DNS as burned.

Observability first

Every mitigation decision is logged with its reasons, and every log line can be traced to the rule and score components that produced it. When a customer asks why a request was challenged, the answer is a link, not a guess.

Logs stream to the customer’s SIEM within seconds, which also means their security team sees attacks in the same tools they use for everything else.

We will follow up with the numbers from the next quarter.