On Monday 21 July 2025 at 15:21 UTC, a search endpoint flood targeted a online casino customer in Central Europe. The attack peaked at 923.9 million requests per second and lasted 160 minutes. Traffic originated from 522 autonomous systems in 84 countries, predominantly hijacked home routers.
| Vector | search endpoint flood |
| Peak | 923.9 million requests per second |
| Duration | 160 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.081 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.053% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.18% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by an extortion email received two days earlier. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 197 within 30 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?