On Tuesday 2 September 2025 at 20:56 UTC, a ACK flood targeted a crypto exchange customer in North America. The attack peaked at 117.4 Gbps and lasted 97 minutes. Traffic originated from 3918 autonomous systems in 62 countries, predominantly a Mirai-derived IoT botnet.
| Vector | ACK flood |
| Peak | 117.4 Gbps |
| Duration | 97 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.505 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.082% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.52% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 23 points of presence.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Clear and practical, thanks.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.
Do you publish the edge IP ranges in a machine-readable format?
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.