On Sunday 2 November 2025 at 05:48 UTC, a carpet-bombing UDP flood targeted a ticketing customer in the Middle East. The attack peaked at 298.2 Gbps and lasted 95 minutes. Traffic originated from 2616 autonomous systems in 41 countries, predominantly a Mirai-derived IoT botnet.
| Vector | carpet-bombing UDP flood |
| Peak | 298.2 Gbps |
| Duration | 95 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.369 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.035% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.49% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 21 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Clear and practical, thanks.