On Friday 6 February 2026 at 15:44 UTC, a HTTP POST flood targeted a education platform customer in the Nordics. The attack peaked at 441.0 million requests per second and lasted 142 minutes. Traffic originated from 2070 autonomous systems in 55 countries, predominantly a headless-browser farm.
| Vector | HTTP POST flood |
| Peak | 441.0 million requests per second |
| Duration | 142 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.521 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.024% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.44% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 768 within 33 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
Clear and practical, thanks.
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.