On Saturday 21 February 2026 at 23:53 UTC, a HTTP GET flood targeted a healthcare portal customer in Iberia. The attack peaked at 338.1 million requests per second and lasted 174 minutes. Traffic originated from 4155 autonomous systems in 90 countries, predominantly a Mirai-derived IoT botnet.
| Vector | HTTP GET flood |
| Peak | 338.1 million requests per second |
| Duration | 174 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.100 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.063% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.64% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 238 within 25 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?