On Saturday 7 March 2026 at 02:40 UTC, a credential stuffing targeted a online payments customer in the Nordics. The attack peaked at 933.8 million requests per second and lasted 93 minutes. Traffic originated from 1888 autonomous systems in 83 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | credential stuffing |
| Peak | 933.8 million requests per second |
| Duration | 93 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.490 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.007% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.60% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 457 within 16 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
A brief increase in p99 latency of 235 ms during the first minute, then normal service.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
Carpet bombing is nasty. Good to see a clear explanation of it.
Do you publish the edge IP ranges in a machine-readable format?
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
Carpet bombing is nasty. Good to see a clear explanation of it.