On Wednesday 25 March 2026 at 04:12 UTC, a GRE flood targeted a crypto exchange customer in the Benelux. The attack peaked at 36.1 Gbps and lasted 19 minutes. Traffic originated from 1184 autonomous systems in 97 countries, predominantly compromised cloud VMs.
| Vector | GRE flood |
| Peak | 36.1 Gbps |
| Duration | 19 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.731 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.004% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.33% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a competitor’s product launch. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 28 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.