On Tuesday 7 April 2026 at 03:27 UTC, a HTTP GET flood targeted a electronics retail customer in Western Europe. The attack peaked at 471.3 million requests per second and lasted 145 minutes. Traffic originated from 701 autonomous systems in 39 countries, predominantly hijacked home routers.
| Vector | HTTP GET flood |
| Peak | 471.3 million requests per second |
| Duration | 145 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.704 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.019% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.33% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a publicly announced sales event. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 349 within 19 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
The billing model is what got our finance team on board, honestly.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Good question. We will cover that in a follow-up post.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.