On Wednesday 15 April 2026 at 17:24 UTC, a HTTP/2 rapid reset targeted a sports betting customer in Southeast Asia. The attack peaked at 571.7 million requests per second and lasted 88 minutes. Traffic originated from 2813 autonomous systems in 33 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | HTTP/2 rapid reset |
| Peak | 571.7 million requests per second |
| Duration | 88 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.582 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.011% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.45% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a ransom note demanding payment in Monero. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 101 within 30 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.