On Tuesday 26 May 2026 at 15:44 UTC, a HTTP/2 rapid reset targeted a airline booking customer in Western Europe. The attack peaked at 627.6 million requests per second and lasted 122 minutes. Traffic originated from 3281 autonomous systems in 100 countries, predominantly a headless-browser farm.
| Vector | HTTP/2 rapid reset |
| Peak | 627.6 million requests per second |
| Duration | 122 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.591 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.083% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.21% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a publicly announced sales event. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 272 within 27 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.