On Friday 12 June 2026 at 12:58 UTC, a login endpoint flood targeted a gaming community customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 739.0 million requests per second and lasted 76 minutes. Traffic originated from 752 autonomous systems in 76 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | login endpoint flood |
| Peak | 739.0 million requests per second |
| Duration | 76 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.107 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.043% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.09% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a hacktivist channel announcing the target. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 165 within 10 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Clear and practical, thanks.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.