On Monday 29 June 2026 at 10:54 UTC, a Slowloris targeted a crypto exchange customer in North America. The attack peaked at 788.2 million requests per second and lasted 139 minutes. Traffic originated from 1882 autonomous systems in 117 countries, predominantly compromised cloud VMs.
| Vector | Slowloris |
| Peak | 788.2 million requests per second |
| Duration | 139 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.182 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.045% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.26% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 451 within 27 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.
Do you publish the edge IP ranges in a machine-readable format?
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.