On Tuesday 30 June 2026 at 15:07 UTC, a GRE flood targeted a gaming community customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 358.8 Gbps and lasted 143 minutes. Traffic originated from 3128 autonomous systems in 50 countries, predominantly mobile carrier ranges.
| Vector | GRE flood |
| Peak | 358.8 Gbps |
| Duration | 143 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.199 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.062% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.46% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 36 points of presence.
What the customer saw
A brief increase in p99 latency of 170 ms during the first minute, then normal service.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Good question. We will cover that in a follow-up post.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
Clear and practical, thanks.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.