On Friday 3 July 2026 at 06:57 UTC, a HTTP/2 rapid reset targeted a online payments customer in Southeast Asia. The attack peaked at 787.3 million requests per second and lasted 138 minutes. Traffic originated from 3744 autonomous systems in 72 countries, predominantly misconfigured open reflectors.
| Vector | HTTP/2 rapid reset |
| Peak | 787.3 million requests per second |
| Duration | 138 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.926 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.027% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.75% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 158 within 16 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?