On Saturday 1 August 2026 at 23:57 UTC, a Slowloris targeted a tax authority portal customer in the Middle East. The attack peaked at 595.8 million requests per second and lasted 68 minutes. Traffic originated from 4027 autonomous systems in 93 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | Slowloris |
| Peak | 595.8 million requests per second |
| Duration | 68 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.937 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.034% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.16% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a competitor’s product launch. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 285 within 37 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
The billing model is what got our finance team on board, honestly.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.