On Tuesday 4 August 2026 at 20:08 UTC, a CLDAP reflection targeted a video streaming customer in Latin America. The attack peaked at 253.3 Gbps and lasted 115 minutes. Traffic originated from 3290 autonomous systems in 109 countries, predominantly misconfigured open reflectors.
| Vector | CLDAP reflection |
| Peak | 253.3 Gbps |
| Duration | 115 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.407 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.074% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.24% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by an extortion email received two days earlier. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 38 points of presence.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
Carpet bombing is nasty. Good to see a clear explanation of it.
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
The billing model is what got our finance team on board, honestly.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?