On Tuesday 5 October 2021 at 13:55 UTC, a memcached amplification targeted a online payments customer in Southeast Asia. The attack peaked at 372.2 Gbps and lasted 125 minutes. Traffic originated from 1915 autonomous systems in 79 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | memcached amplification |
| Peak | 372.2 Gbps |
| Duration | 125 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.185 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.071% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.23% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 12 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.