On Friday 30 September 2022 at 15:20 UTC, a search endpoint flood targeted a online casino customer in the Nordics. The attack peaked at 468.1 million requests per second and lasted 176 minutes. Traffic originated from 346 autonomous systems in 78 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | search endpoint flood |
| Peak | 468.1 million requests per second |
| Duration | 176 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.521 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.085% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.06% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a ransom note demanding payment in Monero. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 790 within 16 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?