On Monday 24 October 2022 at 11:22 UTC, a search endpoint flood targeted a online casino customer in Latin America. The attack peaked at 477.8 million requests per second and lasted 95 minutes. Traffic originated from 4125 autonomous systems in 109 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | search endpoint flood |
| Peak | 477.8 million requests per second |
| Duration | 95 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.078 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.050% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.18% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 733 within 29 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.