On Friday 5 May 2023 at 14:39 UTC, a UDP reflection (NTP) targeted a ticketing customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 275.7 Gbps and lasted 107 minutes. Traffic originated from 2683 autonomous systems in 104 countries, predominantly misconfigured open reflectors.
| Vector | UDP reflection (NTP) |
| Peak | 275.7 Gbps |
| Duration | 107 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.824 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.086% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.10% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 39 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
Do you publish the edge IP ranges in a machine-readable format?
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.
The billing model is what got our finance team on board, honestly.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.