On Tuesday 1 August 2023 at 21:39 UTC, a HTTP POST flood targeted a developer platform customer in Southeast Asia. The attack peaked at 651.1 million requests per second and lasted 144 minutes. Traffic originated from 2490 autonomous systems in 32 countries, predominantly hijacked home routers.
| Vector | HTTP POST flood |
| Peak | 651.1 million requests per second |
| Duration | 144 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.718 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.074% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.55% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 425 within 6 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.