On Friday 12 January 2024 at 19:49 UTC, a GRE flood targeted a crypto exchange customer in Iberia. The attack peaked at 47.5 Gbps and lasted 6 minutes. Traffic originated from 4168 autonomous systems in 18 countries, predominantly hijacked home routers.
| Vector | GRE flood |
| Peak | 47.5 Gbps |
| Duration | 6 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.086 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.003% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.02% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 39 points of presence.
What the customer saw
A brief increase in p99 latency of 132 ms during the first minute, then normal service.
Recommendations
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Good question. We will cover that in a follow-up post.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.