On Wednesday 26 April 2023 at 04:44 UTC, a SYN flood targeted a crypto exchange customer in Central Europe. The attack peaked at 61.8 Gbps and lasted 10 minutes. Traffic originated from 1913 autonomous systems in 109 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | SYN flood |
| Peak | 61.8 Gbps |
| Duration | 10 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.931 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.079% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.37% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 31 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Clear and practical, thanks.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?