Anycast is not magic: how we route attacks across 40 PoPs (part 2)

Here is a question we could not answer well a year ago: what really happens with anycast is not magic: how we route attacks across 40 PoPs? We can answer it now.

Why per-route baselines matter

A thousand requests per second to your homepage is Tuesday. A thousand requests per second to your password-reset endpoint is an attack. Global rate limits cannot tell the difference; per-route baselines can.

We learn the normal shape of traffic per route and per hour of the week, so a surge on a sensitive endpoint raises the risk score long before it approaches a global threshold.

The economics behind it

A booter service rents out a 100 Gbps attack for less than the price of a pizza. Defending against it with bandwidth alone is a race you lose. Defending against it by making each malicious request cost more than it earns is a race you win.

This is the entire idea behind never metering attack traffic: our costs scale with filtering, not with your invoice.

Challenges beat blocks

Blocking lists go stale within minutes when attackers rotate through residential proxies. Proof-of-work does not care where a request comes from; it only cares whether the client is willing to pay the cost.

For a real browser that cost is a few hundred milliseconds, once per session. For a botnet sending a million requests a minute it is a million puzzles a minute — and at that point the attack stops being cheap.

Observability first

Every mitigation decision is logged with its reasons, and every log line can be traced to the rule and score components that produced it. When a customer asks why a request was challenged, the answer is a link, not a guess.

Logs stream to the customer’s SIEM within seconds, which also means their security team sees attacks in the same tools they use for everything else.

{ "match": { "path": "/search", "risk": ">= 57" }, "action": "challenge" }

If you run into any of this in your own environment, our SOC is happy to take a look — even if you are not a customer.

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