On Sunday 6 April 2025 at 09:08 UTC, a GRE flood targeted a gaming community customer in Western Europe. The attack peaked at 218.3 Gbps and lasted 79 minutes. Traffic originated from 623 autonomous systems in 83 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | GRE flood |
| Peak | 218.3 Gbps |
| Duration | 79 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.303 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.007% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.80% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by an extortion email received two days earlier. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 17 points of presence.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.