On Wednesday 30 April 2025 at 14:54 UTC, a UDP reflection (DNS) targeted a electronics retail customer in the Nordics. The attack peaked at 374.1 Gbps and lasted 116 minutes. Traffic originated from 1115 autonomous systems in 54 countries, predominantly a rented booter service.
| Vector | UDP reflection (DNS) |
| Peak | 374.1 Gbps |
| Duration | 116 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.655 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.060% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.48% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 27 points of presence.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
Carpet bombing is nasty. Good to see a clear explanation of it.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Good question. We will cover that in a follow-up post.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.