On Saturday 24 May 2025 at 08:57 UTC, a HTTP GET flood targeted a tax authority portal customer in Southeast Asia. The attack peaked at 639.3 million requests per second and lasted 112 minutes. Traffic originated from 3064 autonomous systems in 95 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | HTTP GET flood |
| Peak | 639.3 million requests per second |
| Duration | 112 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.023 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.001% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.44% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a ransom note demanding payment in Monero. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 698 within 12 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?