On Sunday 15 February 2026 at 22:46 UTC, a HTTP POST flood targeted a ticketing customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 806.0 million requests per second and lasted 16 minutes. Traffic originated from 2593 autonomous systems in 82 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | HTTP POST flood |
| Peak | 806.0 million requests per second |
| Duration | 16 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.798 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.055% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.22% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 741 within 20 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.