On Wednesday 20 May 2026 at 19:44 UTC, a UDP reflection (DNS) targeted a healthcare portal customer in the Nordics. The attack peaked at 241.1 Gbps and lasted 144 minutes. Traffic originated from 91 autonomous systems in 59 countries, predominantly misconfigured open reflectors.
| Vector | UDP reflection (DNS) |
| Peak | 241.1 Gbps |
| Duration | 144 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.246 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.031% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.33% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a hacktivist channel announcing the target. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 40 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
This matches what we see in iGaming around big matches.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.