On Sunday 12 July 2026 at 04:26 UTC, a UDP reflection (NTP) targeted a B2B SaaS customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 337.1 Gbps and lasted 149 minutes. Traffic originated from 3454 autonomous systems in 81 countries, predominantly hijacked home routers.
| Vector | UDP reflection (NTP) |
| Peak | 337.1 Gbps |
| Duration | 149 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.585 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.000% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.44% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a ransom note demanding payment in Monero. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 27 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.
Verified good bots and allow-listed partners bypass challenges entirely.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Machine-readable ranges are at /ips.json and via the API.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
Clear and practical, thanks.