On Wednesday 15 July 2026 at 00:51 UTC, a carpet-bombing UDP flood targeted a retail banking customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 372.1 Gbps and lasted 116 minutes. Traffic originated from 2362 autonomous systems in 11 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | carpet-bombing UDP flood |
| Peak | 372.1 Gbps |
| Duration | 116 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.566 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.030% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.66% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a competitor’s product launch. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 40 points of presence.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
- Enable authenticated origin pulls.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Good question. We will cover that in a follow-up post.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Thanks — sharing this with our on-call team.