On Thursday 20 August 2026 at 14:40 UTC, a HTTP GET flood targeted a fashion retail customer in Southeast Asia. The attack peaked at 777.4 million requests per second and lasted 51 minutes. Traffic originated from 3112 autonomous systems in 65 countries, predominantly compromised cloud VMs.
| Vector | HTTP GET flood |
| Peak | 777.4 million requests per second |
| Duration | 51 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.912 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.053% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.73% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 332 within 21 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
A brief increase in p99 latency of 96 ms during the first minute, then normal service.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.