On Saturday 5 September 2026 at 17:06 UTC, a Slowloris targeted a online casino customer in the UK. The attack peaked at 894.1 million requests per second and lasted 52 minutes. Traffic originated from 574 autonomous systems in 43 countries, predominantly hijacked home routers.
| Vector | Slowloris |
| Peak | 894.1 million requests per second |
| Duration | 52 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.222 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.013% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.13% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a hacktivist channel announcing the target. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 70 within 37 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
Checkout conversion was unchanged compared with the same hour of the previous week.
Recommendations
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.
Great write-up. We saw almost the same pattern on our login endpoint last month.
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
The billing model is what got our finance team on board, honestly.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
We had the exact false-positive issue with CGNAT carriers. The weighting change makes sense.