On Sunday 13 September 2026 at 09:42 UTC, a login endpoint flood targeted a crypto exchange customer in Iberia. The attack peaked at 456.9 million requests per second and lasted 184 minutes. Traffic originated from 1373 autonomous systems in 74 countries, predominantly residential proxy networks.
| Vector | login endpoint flood |
| Peak | 456.9 million requests per second |
| Duration | 184 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.841 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.020% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.71% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by a breaking political story. Request rates on the targeted routes exceeded their hourly baseline by a factor of 75 within 38 seconds. The risk score of participating clients crossed the challenge threshold automatically and proof-of-work difficulty rose with origin load.
What the customer saw
No customer-visible impact. The on-call engineer was notified and acknowledged the incident from the dashboard.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Keep origin IPs out of public DNS history.
- Enable log streaming to your SIEM for faster correlation.
Nice to read a vendor blog that admits what went wrong.
We moved from a scrubbing provider to always-on last year; time to mitigation went from minutes to basically nothing.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?
Thanks! Yes — the risk score and its components are included in every log record.
Do you publish the edge IP ranges in a machine-readable format?
Any plans to support per-tenant limits keyed on a JWT claim?
Is the risk score exposed in the logs so we can build our own dashboards on it?
The billing model is what got our finance team on board, honestly.
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.