bot management without CAPTCHAs sounds like a narrow topic. It turns out to touch almost every part of how an edge network behaves under attack.
What actually happens during a flood
The first thing to fail during a layer 7 flood is almost never bandwidth. It is connection slots, worker processes or database connections on the origin — resources measured in hundreds or thousands, not gigabits. An attacker who can make each request expensive only needs a few thousand requests per second.
That is why we score requests before they are proxied. By the time a request reaches your origin, it has been attributed to a client, compared against that client’s history and weighed against the current load on the route it targets.
Testing in production, safely
Every rule starts in log mode. We replay the previous seven days of traffic through it and show exactly which requests it would have affected before anyone can promote it to challenge or block.
This one feature has prevented more incidents than any detection we have ever shipped.
Protecting the origin
None of this matters if the attacker can reach your origin directly. Historical DNS records, certificate transparency logs and misconfigured subdomains leak origin addresses all the time.
Allow-list the edge ranges, enable authenticated origin pulls and treat any origin IP that ever appeared in public DNS as burned.
The numbers
Across the last quarter, 71% of challenged clients never attempted a solution, 24% solved one challenge and then behaved normally, and 5% solved challenges repeatedly while continuing to attack — the last group is where analysts spend their time.
Median added latency for legitimate visitors that were challenged was 280 ms on desktop and 410 ms on mid-range Android devices.
{ "match": { "path": "/account/reset", "risk": ">= 47" }, "action": "challenge" }
We will follow up with the numbers from the next quarter.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Great to hear, thanks for sharing your experience.
Carpet bombing is nasty. Good to see a clear explanation of it.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Could you share the dataset behind the percentages?
Our auditors asked for exactly this kind of incident evidence under DORA.
How do you avoid challenging uptime monitors and partners?