On Monday 7 September 2026 at 03:59 UTC, a UDP reflection (DNS) targeted a online casino customer in Central Europe. The attack peaked at 130.4 Gbps and lasted 156 minutes. Traffic originated from 3625 autonomous systems in 65 countries, predominantly misconfigured open reflectors.
| Vector | UDP reflection (DNS) |
| Peak | 130.4 Gbps |
| Duration | 156 min |
| Time to mitigation | 0.233 s |
| Attack traffic reaching origin | 0.061% |
| Legitimate traffic challenged | 0.42% |
Timeline
The attack was preceded by no stated motive. Edge packet filters identified the flood by source port and payload signature and dropped it at line rate across 40 points of presence.
What the customer saw
The customer’s status page stayed green throughout; they learned about the attack from our notification.
Recommendations
- Add a dedicated rate limit for the targeted route.
- Review allow-listed partner ranges quarterly.
- Lower challenge thresholds on authentication endpoints during high-risk events.
The point about origin IPs leaking through certificate transparency logs is underrated.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Solid runbook advice. The DNS-at-2am point hit home.
Interesting that most attacks are under ten minutes. Our experience is similar.
Would love a follow-up on how you handle HTTP/3 fingerprinting.
Do you publish the edge IP ranges in a machine-readable format?